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Resumen 
 
Se formula una nueva propuesta sobre la economía de la salud que involucre a las 
instituciones. Las decisiones relacionadas con la salud se toman bajo algún tipo de 
incertidumbre, en especial en lo que tiene que ver con las instituciones que se ocupan o 
se desenvuelven en esta área. El abordar estas instituciones de una manera seria 
permite que pasemos de la economía de la atención médica (lugar en dónde se 
concentran la mayor parte de las investigaciones) a una economía real de la salud. Este 
paso también permite que expliquemos el aumento del gasto en salud como un 
resultado de la interacción entre las instituciones sociales. En este enfoque, la unidad 
del análisis se ha desplazado más hacia la norma que hacia algún agente individual; en 
resumidas cuentas, el agente del estudio es la institución 
 
Palabras claves: instituciones, comportamiento, salud, normas, hábitos. JEL: B520, 
B410, I10, I19. 
 
Abstract 
 
A reformulation of health economics is proposed that explicitly involves institutions. 
Decisions regarding health are taken under uncertainty, in the face of which 
institutions work and allow dealing with it. Taking institutions seriously allows moving 
forward from the economics of medical care (on which the mainstream has focused) to 
a real economics of health; it also allows explaining the growth of health expenditure 
as the result of the interaction of social institutions. In this approach, the unit of 
analysis is changed to the rule, rather than the individual agent. The subject of study is 
the institution. 
 
Key words: Institutions, Behaviour, Health, Rules, Habits. JEL: B520, B410, I100, 
I190.  
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In his article taking stock of health economics, Mark Blaug (1998:S65) 
showed his surprise regarding the fact that this area of study was not more 
frequented by heterodox economists. “Health economics would seem to be a 
perfect topic for heterodox dissent and yet, surprisingly enough, radical 
economists and Marxists have not on the whole been attracted to health 
economics. Still, and this is my main point, health economics is a field 
which must make the average neoclassical economist squirm because it 
challenges his or her standard assumptions at every turn. Perhaps that is 
precisely what makes it so interesting to study.” 
 
Health economics has become a rapidly developing branch of economics 
since its emergence in the 1970s. However, it has had to face important 
limitations since then. Firstly, as Arrow (1963) mentioned in his pioneering 
article on the topic, the system’s main characteristic lies in the ubiquity of 
radical uncertainty. When there is uncertainty, there is neither sense in 
characterizing individuals’ behaviour as the maximizing of an objective 
function, nor in drawing conclusions about policy from static models. Hence, 
when health economics is limited to imitating the standard text of 
microeconomics, changing the name of the agents or products, it is simply 
evading the problem. 
 
A second difficulty is of a more semantic nature. Arrow made it clear that 
health economics does not deal with health but rather the health service 
industry; those who came to work in the field after him concentrated 
exclusively on the health service industry, but calling such a disciplinary field 
“health economics.” The suggestion that conclusions derived from studying 
the health service industry are applicable lay hidden behind the erroneous 
use of the terms (i.e. health policy, this being a much wider field). 
 
This article is aimed at proposing a reformulation of health economics 
thereby making it worthy of using this name and taking uncertainty 
seriously. Such reformulation is based on the notion of institution, which 
becomes a key subject, and introducing the rule as the unit of analysis in 
place of the maximizing individual.1 
                                                 
1 Although habits are extremely important in a theory of institutions (as they allow to 
explain how individuals interact with institutions), habits are not that important when we 
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The term institution is used here to refer to a “durable system of established, 
embedded and potentially codifiable social rules and conventions that 
structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2004: 297). Individuals’ and firms´ 
actions are moulded by institutions and can be described as propensity-
driven repetitive behaviour, such as habits and routines (Hodgson, 1997)i. 
Not only maximizing an objective function can be seen as one among several 
possible rules, but maximization itself becomes impossible in many cases 
due to the conditions imposed by bounded rationality (Simon, 1976). 
Individuals use rules in such situations letting them act where the mere use 
of reason hampers action (Keynes, 1936). There are also social mechanisms 
reinforcing the adoption of a system of rules. 
 
This article presents the field of health economics and its development 
during the last few decades. It then shows how there is a problem regarding 
the coherence of the unit of analysis for traditional health economics; it 
therefore proposes using the rule as the unit of analysis. In this approach, 
institutions emerge and work grounded on social  mechanisms in situations 
of extreme ignorance regarding the future, hence the types of ignorance 
existing in the health sector are identified, uncertainty is emphasized and the 
relevant institutions are examined. The implications for the sector arising 
from the existence of such institutions are shown. Lastly, attention is drawn 
to the advantages for health economics resulting from adopting the proposed 
approach. 
 
 
Health economics 
 
Kenneth Arrow’s 1963 article entitled, “Uncertainty and the Welfare 
Economics of Medical Care,” marked the discipline’s commencement. Arrow 
differentiated between health and health services, making it clear that they 
only deal with providing health services, this being just one of the many 
factors determining health. He also pointed to uncertainty as being these 
services’ fundamental characteristic and the source of economic problems 
arising in this market. Uncertainty regarding the incidence of disease and the 
effectiveness of treating it has brought about the absence of markets for 
actions leading to health which could be identifiable or even technologically 
possible.  
                                                                                                                                                  
focus on health, in particular on the evolution of health expenditure. For in this field it is 
the effects of the system of rules that matter, not so much the causal mechanisms 
explaining why the individual acquires habits and follows rules. 
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Once analysis became focused on the health services industry and this good’s 
special characteristics had been identified, later studies were centered on 
determining whether standard economic analysis could be applied to 
analyzing the health services industry. The applicability of conventional 
economic analysis was mainly defended by North American economists such 
as Paul Feldestain, Martin Feldestain, Josep Newhouse and Charles Phelps, 
for whom the market was the only entity capable of adapting itself to 
consumers’ different desires. Other forms of health assignation would be 
inefficient as they would produce an excess or deficit in the production of 
those services which individuals wished to consume, coming with different 
quality and prices to that which they were willing to pay. It is considered that 
the consumption of services depends on an individual’s income level from 
this viewpoint and it is accepted that consumers reign supreme and take 
decisions seeking to maximize their benefits. It can thus be deduced that the 
demand for health services is initiated by the patients.  
 
Whilst consumers are considered to be sovereign and maximizers, the same 
does not happen with doctors to whom maximizing conduct is not 
attributed; rather, emphasis is placed on changing their ethical behaviour. 
The topic of induced demand is thus evaded; this being understood as 
doctor-initiated demand where patients would not have accepted if the same 
information had been made available to them as to the doctor. This is a 
recognized and important phenomenon due to its implications in public 
policy (Rodriguez, 1988). Many studies which have followed this approach 
have sought to estimate health service demand elasticity, price and income. 
 
Michael Grossman (1972) formulated his model of health service demand in 
the 1970s as deriving from the demand for health. Health results from many 
things in this model, health services simply being one more consumer item. 
Even though this argument seems obvious, it had not been tackled in the 
bibliography before 1972. Grossman considered health capital to be another 
form of human capital and (like all forms of human capital) it is individuals 
who combine different consumables for their production process, in the 
sense that when individuals have greater education they have greater ability 
for combining consumables and improving their health production. Health 
thus becomes a consumer good and investment good here (Grossman, 
2000). Even though this model was innovative, it continued to be based on 
consumer sovereignty.  
 
These studies generally evade the topic of uncertainty and suppose that an 
individual is able to identify the characteristics of the services in demand and 
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evaluate the quantities and prices offered by the market. Blaug (1998) 
pointed out that the large amount of studies in this line dealt with the USA’s 
existing health system which is not just private but also privately financed 
via medical insurance, meaning that the concepts of standard economics can 
be applied to market prices and maximizing utility. On the contrary, a public 
health system’s dependence on public provision does not provide ideal 
terrain for economic analysis. British health economics has thus not been 
eclipsed by the US model but can be considered to be an everyday alternative 
to it. 
  
The British approach recognizes that health services obey need rather than 
desire and that this is randomly produced; the market is thus rejected as the 
mechanism for assigning, distributing and evaluating the efficient use of 
health services. The assignation and rationing mechanism thus depends on 
the notion of need where individuals receive care whilst the experts 
independently determine a patient’s disposition and ability to pay. As the 
objective is to provide equality of treatment independently of the ability to 
pay, studies respecting equity have received a lot of attention. Le Grand 
(2000) and Culyer and Wagstaff’s (1993) work is representative of this line 
of thought. 
 
Important developments have also happened in Great Britain regarding how 
results in health are evaluated. The literature on evaluating treatment for 
managing disease was centred on analysing cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness up to 1980. The former presents problems due to the difficulty 
of evaluating benefits in monetary terms. This type of analysis has been 
excluded in the UK due to the technical impossibility of measuring costs. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is also limited because there is no strong evidence 
about the effectiveness of treatment; however, the British have defined a 
quality-adjusted-life-years (QALY) indicator for cost-utility analysis. QALY 
criteria deliberately reject Pareto’s criterion regarding ability to pay for 
treatment and accept comparing effects according to how a patient perceives 
them (Blaug, 1998). 
 
The two currents of the discipline’s development are subject to the 
differences inherent in the health systems predominating in both countries; 
the US system is orientated more towards efficiency rather than equity whilst 
the UK has concentrated more on equity than efficiency. US analysis has 
concentrated on the market and that in the UK on non-mercantile 
assignation. Event though being important when developing policy, the UK 
school’s theoretical position surely has weaknesses, as not explaining how 
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the market works leads to supposing that this has been well-described from 
the other viewpoint. 
 
Both currents have tried to provide a solution to an empirical problem: the 
evolution of expenditure. Increased costs are significant in both systems 
though the problem is greater in the US, in spite of private participation 
being much greater in this country and a competitive market being expected 
to promote efficiency (Porter and Olmstead, 2004). 
 
Increased spending has been attributed to different causes; demographic 
transition is one of these, increasing chronic and degenerative disease and 
thereby producing prolonged demand for sophisticated and costly treatment 
having poor curative capacity. Another argument put forward refers to 
problems regarding work productivity, making “Baumol’s cost disease” 
applicable to the sector as, according to Baumol, the relative costs of a sector 
like this become increased, since wages are proportionally increased in all 
sectors (Baumol and Bowen, 1966). Other reasons have been identified such 
as the interests of the pharmaceutical industry determining guidelines for 
consuming services, changes in social costumes (Ortún, 1992) and the 
absence of price mechanisms (the last being questionable, given that private 
health systems have not been shown to be a suitable alternative for 
containing costs).  
 
Studies by Newhouse (1977), Parkin, McGuire and Yule (1987) and 
Guertham and Jönsson (2000), comparing different countries’ health 
expenditure, reveal that income is the factor explaining variation in spending 
and that elasticity even becomes greater than the unit, medical care thereby 
being considered to be a luxury good. Guertham and Jönsson have also 
found that using primary attention lowers health expenditure and that the 
mechanism for remunerating doctors influences costs. Per capita payment 
tends to lower expenditure more than payment for services, bringing one 
once again to the topic of inducing demand (Guertham and Jönsson, 2000).  
 
The second problem to be resolved consists of explaining health economics, 
not just health service economics, as health (and thus an individual’s 
wellbeing) depends more on a different behaviour rather than on treatment 
assigned when a person becomes ill. Consequently, concentrating on supply 
and demand  is, in the best of cases, a narrow approach. 
 
In what follows, it is supposed that theoretically satisfactory health 
economics must provide a reply to these two questions within a coherent 
theoretical framework. The following section shows that defining a suitable 
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unit of analysis presents an important theoretical difficulty from both health 
economics’ viewpoints. 
 
 
The unit of analysis 
 
Health economics uses conventional microeconomics for posing problems, 
taking individual agents as the unit of analysis (i.e. hospitals, doctors and 
patients). Preferences, initial provision and technology are taken as given; 
interaction in the market leads to optimum assignment of resources in 
perfect competition. When imperfection occurs, the result becomes altered 
within this reference framework. This is the case with the US viewpoint 
emphasizing the market; however, it also occurs in the British one which 
seeks equity with assignation provided by a state entity but the unit of 
analysis continues being the patient, doctor or hospital. 
 
This broad shared framework has led to wide discussion which, however, 
does not alter it. The US view may be criticized for assuming that doctors are 
guided by ethics and do not take economic considerations into account, but 
theoretically it is not a problem as altruistic preferences may be assumed in 
the neoclassical scheme. The difficulty in explaining the growth of 
expenditure is of much greater interest here. 
 
One of the more important explanations for the growth of expenditure lies in 
inducing demand. It has been known for a long time that diagnosis and 
treatment crucially depend on the doctor (given that one hopes that a doctor 
knows more than a patient). However, diagnosis and treatment importantly 
determine the type and quantity of health service consumption. This makes 
the idea of consumer sovereignty lose its sense in this case and patients 
cannot now be a unit of analysis, given that their decisions are not 
autonomous and their “preferences” are not given but rather determined by 
the doctor. Close relationships between doctors and medical supply 
companies or a medical team mean that doctors’ decisions do become 
influenced by the suppliers. The widely known fact that repetitive behaviour 
greatly affect health can be added to this, finding that the explanation for 
these phenomena come into conflict with the idea of agents as the unit of 
analysis. 
 
An important reason for why it is doubtful whether an individual agent 
should be the suitable unit of analysis is that generalized uncertainty 
impedes an agent being able to take decisions. Agents cannot concentrate on 
optimizing their choices as assigned by neoclassical theory because they do 
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not have the ability to make the calculations or the necessary information to 
do so. An individual then follows rules take by society. If we define 
institution as a “durable system of established, embedded and potentially 
codifiable social rules and conventions that structure social interactions”, 
being a reinforced system of socially adopted rules, it can be said that 
institutions are a more appropriate object of study for explaining topics 
referring to health; rules would thus represent a more suitable unit of 
analysis. 
 
If it is important to note the existence of generalized uncertainty, it should 
also be observed that this is part of a greater set of problems regarding 
information in the health area. Ignorance of future events is manifest in 
several ways, some being characterized as being probabilistic (risk), others 
not (uncertainty) (Knight, 1928 / Keynes, 1936). 
 
Basic uncertainty in health has to do with the emergence of disease and 
effectiveness of treatment. The occurrence of the first is as unpredictable as 
that of the second. If disease emerges relatively randomly amongst 
individuals, its extent and regularity are highly unpredictable for each 
particular individual. Uncertainty is just an extreme case of ignorance 
appearing in health in different ways.  
 
One type of ignorance in this system refers to that of individuals; they do not 
have sufficient knowledge of a particular disease or how to diagnose it and 
treat it, so they go to a doctor who will provide treatment. The complexity of 
medical knowledge supposes that a patient’s information regarding 
treatment and its effects is inferior to that of a doctor. Professional 
socialization of physicians, on the one hand, and the making of a particular 
image of the doctor in the society, on the other hand, establish social rules of 
delegation and trust that work through institutions. Thus, in mitigating an 
individual’s uncertainty regarding the quality of treatment, following the set 
of rules is reinforced and this set is extended to the whole of society.  
 
The following type of ignorance appears when a doctor is confronted with 
some symptoms for treating a disease. Passing from symptoms to disease is 
not mechanical but rather a process of exegesis. Indeed, symptoms for the 
same disease can be different according to a particular patient, as a patient 
represents an organic whole more than the sum of different organs. The idea 
of what is meant by health or disease depends on each age and culture. As 
with the above point, it cannot be known with certainty how an individual 
will react to a particular treatment. Different doctors may arrive at a 
different diagnosis when faced with determined symptoms (Cullis and West, 
BRINGING INSTITUTIONS INTO HEALTH ECONOMICS  
 
   Pá
gin
a 10
 
1984). It is possible that different doctors may not come to consensus 
concerning treatment regarding the same diagnosis. 
 
New elements of ignorance appear if other relationships are considered 
(apart from the doctor-patient relationship). If a health system similar to 
that of many western countries is considered, it can be found that 
individuals’ needs are attended by doctors. Doctors in turn work in more 
complex organizations such as hospitals and clinics which in turn maintain 
contracts with insurance companies which may depend on the state. In this 
situation, the insuring entity ignores whether what is paid for attending its 
affiliates is suitable or whether payment considerably exceeds the cost. A 
hospital administrator ignores whether a doctor is providing sufficient 
treatment for a patient, if it exceeds the rule or is insufficient and whether 
what is received will be sufficient for satisfying the demand for attention. A 
government may also ask whether the resources dedicated to the sector are 
being suitably used. 
 
Some of the problems regarding information refer to risk situations, others 
can be considered to be information asymmetry and others as problems of 
radical uncertainty. It can therefore be postulated that ignorance leads to 
collective behaviour following rules in a setting in which it is mainly 
presented as uncertainty. In cases where ignorance is probabilistic, the rules 
may refer to using concepts of risk and may even include maximization 
procedures. However, maximization is just one more rule here. (Hodgson, 
1997) 
 
 
An institutional approach in action 
 
Concrete examples of rules and institutions can now be considered. Each 
element of ignorance mentioned in the above section can be found in 
practice in different forms. The probability of the appearance of a particular 
disease may be computed, even though it would be impossible to make a 
prediction with certainty for a particular individual. Predictions are thus 
made for a set of people, understanding that such prediction will be fulfilled 
for the majority. Grouping is therefore chosen as a mechanism for 
counteracting risk associated with the occurrence of disease. 
 
In the face of the question of identifying disease by means of the exegesis of 
symptoms, a doctor is helped by standardized rules laid down in the 
profession’s protocols which has originated semiotics. The same happens 
regarding treatment. The protocol defines which the disease’s symptoms are 
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and which treatment should be followed according to the case. The 
institution of the protocols referring to attention allows action to be taken 
regarding the uncertainty of treatment. Treatment cannot be effective in 
some cases and may even become harmful, but opting for a particular 
institution limits the consequences which this may produce for the provider.  
 
An individual’s ignorance regarding the quality of treatment is counteracted 
by the license granted by an authority for guaranteeing minimum quality.  
 
A social system of rules (i.e. an institution) is the response to uncertainty in 
all these cases, and not individual decisions. Institutions are those entities 
regulating the doctor-patient relationship and the way doctors are organized. 
The definition itself of what is considered disease results from a process of 
interpretation mediated by patients’ systems of socially accepted beliefs and 
those of their families and by doctors’ collectively accepted protocols. 
Institutions  are thus the object of study and rules must constitute the unit of 
analysis given that an individual’s disease, treatment and behaviour are 
mediated by such institutions. Health economics rethought in this way could 
easily deal with questions relating to both the market and those referring to 
non-mercantile situations. 
 
An even more important benefit of the proposed approach is that it 
facilitates moving from health services economics to health economics and 
proposing more relevant policies. 
 
Recommendations concerning how to improve health and how to reduce 
expenditure are currently concentrated on the individual even though it has 
been shown that this unit of analysis presents difficulties given that 
individuals do not act in isolation but within a context. It is clear that if one 
accepts that the definition of disease has a social nature, then acting on 
particular individuals does not guarantee change being achieved in any of 
them. 
 
Institutions make the system reduce the possibilities of choice and 
maximization. The patient does not choose in the health system; it is the 
doctor who “chooses” and does so based on rules such as the protocols pre-
established by the profession, in such a way that choice is delimited by them 
and what appears in the protocols is conditioned by the influence of 
innovations produced in the industry. There are thus few things to choose; 
the rules are simply followed in this case. The mechanism for reinforcing the 
system of rules is the pairing made up of fear of death and the hope of 
postponing it, where both are common cultural factors in this type of society. 
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When analysis focuses on the relationship between the health service 
industry and individuals, the problem lies in coming back to a system for 
improving the objective (i.e. health), forgetting that this is not just the 
industry. A start is thus made on considering that the work of prevention 
applied to patients provides a result and, of course, the service industry seeks 
to offer or broaden its portfolio of services without identifying and therefore 
involving the true causes. 
 
The problem has to do with confusing health with health services. Health 
economics concentrating more on institutions could more easily deal with 
other factors affecting health. As Dever (1976) and McKewon (1979) have 
pointed out, the determinants of health mostly arise outside the setting for 
providing health services. Elements such as diet and sanitary conditions 
carry more weight in preventing and eliminating disease, whilst health 
services only appear later on, often as the result of others habits and 
behaviour. For instance, tuberculosis was eliminated as a result of changes in 
the population’s diet and sanitary conditions long before medically effective 
therapy became available (Evans, 1996). 
 
In the sense that social rules also explain a good part of habits and behaviour 
leading to or avoiding disease, institutional analysis will allow them to 
become involved in the field of health economics, forming a continuum 
which could closely cooperate with sociology and social sychology. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In a situation of ignorance regarding the future, most of which is not 
probabilistic (uncertainty), the suitable unit for analysis ceases to be the 
individual agent and becomes rather the rules, these in turn being organized 
into institutions or systems reinforced by socially accepted rules. 
 
Concentrating on institutions leads to a clearer view of problems related to 
health, explains the growth of spending on health and allows going beyond 
health service economics to cover most of the determinants of health. An 
institutional approach therefore constitutes a theoretical improvement 
allowing to design more relevant health policies for the world which we live 
in. 
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